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Abstract
In this paper we establish equivalence results for the different semantics for the
temporal STIT logic T-STIT, that includes temporal operators and the group
agency operator for the grand coalition, and we study a semantics for tempo-
ral STIT that is based on the concept of interpreted system a` la Fagin et al.
We discuss the descriptive adequacy of the above semantics in capturing a given
game-theoretical scenario where information about the players is included, and we
compare them with traditional BT+AC semantics. Also, we discuss the exten-
sion of T-STIT with full groups and the corresponding operators, and we discuss
the distinction between frames that impose additivity and superadditivity on the
choices of arbitrary groups.
1 Introduction
STIT logics (the logics of seeing to it that) are the logics of sentences of the form “agent
i sees to it that ϕ is true”, where ‘seeing to it that’ is interpreted as an agent-relative
modal operator. They have been first introduced by Belnap et al. in a number of
papers culminating in [2]. The logic presented there includes the ‘historical necessity’
operator , the temporal operators G and H of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)—together
with their duals F and P—and ‘STIT operators’ for individual agency of the form [i].
In [18] Horty extends this language by introducing group STIT operators of the form
[J ] expressing sentences like “group J sees to it that ϕ is true”, where a group J is
a set of individual agents.1 Some recent research [20] has focused on a fragment of
Horty’s language and semantics where only a STIT operator for the collective action
of all agents appears alongside [i], , G and H. One reason for this is that, under the
definition of the choice of group from [18], full group STIT logic is undecidable and not
finitely axiomatizable [17], while fragments that express only the collective action of
all agents are decidable and finitely axiomatizable [26]. Another reason concerns some
∗The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. This paper was
written while Roberto Ciuni was a Marie Curie IE Fellow with the WADOXA project at the Institute
of Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam (2015–2016).
1Also [2, 281–291] approaches collective (‘joint’) agency. Horty’s variant of group STIT is the most
established in formal investigation on STIT—see for instance [17].
complications brought in by full groups. We briefly discuss the two points later on in
this introduction.
In the last decade, STIT logics have attracted more and more attention in the area
of multi-agent systems (MAS). The reason for this is that they provide a rigorous formal
tool to reason about agents’ interaction and collective agency. This interest has also
prompted a number of formal proposals that modify the original semantics from [2] or
define a language that is altogether different from the one introduced in [18]. As a by-
product of this proliferation, however, a systematic overview is now missing. Besides,
these semantics—as well as the traditional one—lack a property that proves desirable
in computation-oriented analysis: they are not computationally grounded. That is, none
of them displays a clear correspondence between states in the computing system and
configurations in the semantical description of the logic—see [11, p. 151]. We believe
that lack of a global picture and focused computation-oriented analysis may prove a
hindrance for a full encounter between STIT logics and MAS.
In the present paper, we compare three alternative semantics w.r.t. the ‘temporal
STIT logic’ T-STIT proposed in [20]. Besides, we relate the alternative semantics
to the traditional semantics from [2]. Finally, we propose a computationally grounded
semantics for temporal STIT that is based on the concept of interpreted system by Fagin
et al. [12]. The paper has two aims. First, it aims at clarifying the relations among
the different semantics for STIT logics w.r.t. a logic that aims at keeping a balance
between the expressive power from [18] and convenient formal properties. Second, it
aims at providing a semantics that can show in a clear way the connection between
STIT theory and MAS.
In the remainder of the introduction we give a more detailed description of our topic
and present the structure of the paper. Beside, we motivate our modeling choices, and
summarize the rationale of our results.
Structure of the paper The original semantics for STIT logics is proposed by Bel-
nap et al. in [2] and is based on the so-called BT+AC structures: branching-time
(BT) structures—or trees—endowed with a set of agents and a function determining
the possible choices of each agent at any moment (AC is indeed acronym of ‘Agents
and Choices’). Recently, alternative semantics have been proposed: [9] and [20] all
propose semantics that are not based on BT+ACs. In particular, [9] proposes to im-
pose bundles on BT+ACs, thus performing a Henkin move on those structures, and
the temporal Kripke STIT frames introduced in [20] present a one-sorted Kripke frame
where two different relations are defined on points: one defines the temporal dimension
of the frame, the other allows for reasoning about (historical) possibility and necessity.
To these temporal structures, these semantics add a function of choice [9] or a set of
choice-equivalence relations [20] that allows for reasoning about ‘seeing to it that’.2
Beside, a further representation of agency and time can be offered by considering a
natural extension of the Kamp frames from [27], where times and worlds are defined as
primitives, and each world is endowed with a temporal order.
Here, we discuss and generalize the structures from [20], [9], and structures for
2The definition of the single-agent choice b-trees from [9] is equivalent to a definition in terms of 
a choice-equivalence relation (see below). Here, we use a relational semantics for choice b-trees rather 
than a function of choice, since this allows us for a more uniform presentation.
agency and time based on Kamp frames. In doing this, we relax some conditions on the
structures from [9]—for instance, we drop discreteness—and extend them to a multi-
agent setting. We discuss this choice later in this introduction, but it is important to
clarify its rationale now. It will make our result more general, which is in turn a virtue
in view of the global picture of STIT theory we would like to contribute to.
In Section 2, we consider the logic T-STIT introduced in [20], which includes opera-
tors [i] and [Agt ] for individual agency and the collective action of all agents, as well as
the operators G and H for ‘always in the future’ and ‘always in the past’, respectively,
and the operator  of historical necessity. Also, we prove that the three semantics are
equivalent relative to T-STIT. In Section 3, we propose the interpreted system seman-
tics for T-STIT. We prove that, under adequate restrictions, our semantics in terms
of interpreted systems is equivalent to the alternative semantics defined in Section 2.
In Section 4, we sum up the relations among the different semantics presented in the
previous two sections, and we show that the equivalence results proved there do not
extend to the semantics based on BT+AC from [2]. In Section 5, we discuss the exten-
sion of the structures from [20] with choice-equivalence relations for groups of agents
beyond the grand coalition and corresponding group STIT operators, and we highlight
how this affects the equivalence results from Section 2. In Section 6 we briefly discuss
the descriptive adequacy of the alternative semantics, an issue that has not yet been
tackled, at least to the authors’ knowledge. Section 7 draws conclusions and opens
directions for future research. We have placed all the proofs in the technical appendix
at the end of the paper, for the sake of readability.
Rationale Here we present some motivations for our modeling choices and the struc-
tures we discuss in the paper. Along with different structures, different languages for
‘seeing to it that’ and time have been proposed. In particular, [4] and [9] propose
fused stit-temporal operators expressing, among other notions, “agent i sees to it that
next (sooner or later, always in the future)”. Such languages can just express ‘non-
instantaneous agency’. By contrast, the language of T-STIT from [20] can express
‘instantaneous agency’: it includes separate operators for ‘seeing to it that’ and for the
future (or past), that can combine to form stit-temporal formulae.
The rationale of T-STIT is that the language from [18] is still the most widespread
in the community at the crossing between philosophy of agency and MAS. At the same
time, when it comes to a balance between expressive power and relevant formal prop-
erties, T-STIT proves better than the apparatus from [18]. Indeed, the language from
[18] including operators for all definable groups has been proved undecidable and non-
finitely axiomatizable.3 By contrast, T-STIT from [20] has an elegant axiomatization
(see Section 2) and its decidability is still an open issue.4 The languages from [4] and
[9] are of course interesting per se, but their comparison with the structures presented
here requires another paper, on which we wish to devote some future research.
Our focus on T-STIT also implies some modifications on the structures from [9].
First, we drop discreteness for reasons mentioned above. Second, we extend the choice
3As we have mentioned, the result by [17] presupposes the definition of the choice of a group given
in [18]. We discuss another possible definition in Section 5.
4Decidability is also an open issues for the logic from [4], which also includes group STIT operators,
but this logic, as well as the one from [9], is less expressive than a corresponding logic for instantaneous
agency.
b-trees from [9] with choice-equivalence relations for many agents and the grand coali-
tion. Third, we drop the condition from [9] that choice b-trees have a first element. 
These moves allow us to gain a higher generality. Indeed, temporal frames with discrete 
time and a first element are just specific examples of a more general family of temporal 
frames. Since we aim at a systematic overview on the semantics for temporal STIT 
logic, our pursue of a higher generality is justified, we believe.
Also, the distinction between additivity and superadditivity for collective choices 
(see Section 2 for the two notions) brings complications that are not relevant for the 
comparison we are going to carry out in this paper. Here, we impose additivity to the 
choices of the grand coalition, while other semantics—see [4]—impose superadditivity, 
but this choice has no bearing on the the results of the paper: T-STIT does not distin-
guish additive frames from superadditive ones (see Sections 2.3 and 2.5). In Section 5, 
we show that the distinction between additivity and superadditivity becomes relevant 
when considering all groups of agents.
Significance of the results We conclude with some remarks on the relevance of 
our results. The significance of the equivalence result in Section 2 is connected to the 
variety of current semantics for temporal STIT logics, which raises a natural question 
about their relations. In particular, the result guarantees that the three semantics yield 
exactly the same logic—namely T-STIT. The descriptive adequacy of the alternative 
semantics deserves discussion, in our view, because STIT logics aims at being a formal 
theory of agents’ interaction, and not only a computational device. This is in turn the 
rationale of Section 6.
Finally, computationally grounded semantics are interesting as far as they bridge 
the computational insights on multi-agent systems from Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
the foundational approach in terms of Kripke semantics (and extensions) from the 
logical and philosophical investigations on agency and interaction. In this context, the 
significance of our results in Section 3 lies in the possibility of tightening the connection 
between STIT theory and the area of MAS. Indeed, interpreted systems have witnessed 
a number of applications in areas of AI and MAS such as security protocols [14] and 
the blockchain protocol [15]. The interpreted system semantics from Section 3 could 
then open a new potential area of application for STIT logics.
The reason why the interpreted system semantics for STIT of Section 3 is studied 
apart from the three alternative semantics presented in Section 2 is that the former 
makes some assumptions that are not made in the three semantics of Section 2, namely 
the assumption about discreteness of time and the assumption that time has a begin-
ning. Notice that in the original semantics for STIT by Belnap et al. [2] based on 
BT+AC structures, time was not assumed to be discrete. In this sense, the concept of 
time modeled in the interpreted system semantics for STIT is more restrictive than the 
concept of time modeled in the original semantics for STIT by Belnap et al.
2 Three semantics for temporal STIT
The alternative semantics that we study here are the semantics from [20], a semantics 
based on extensions of Kamp frames, and (with some little variations) the semantics
from [9], respectively. We will see them in this section and hint at their formal rationale
in Section 6—where we also discuss their descriptive adequacy.5
In many recent semantics for STIT—such as [1], [4] and [20]—relations of choice
equivalence (one per agent) play the role of the function of choice originally proposed
in [2, 18] and applied in [9]. We go along this line here, without loss of generality: that
the relational treatment and the functional one are equivalent is already observed in
[2].
2.1 Syntax
We consider the language of the logic T-STIT introduced in [20] that extends the
language of atemporal individual STIT from [1, 2] with: (i) the future tense and past
tense operators, and (ii) Horty’s operator of group agency for the grand coalition (the
coalition of all agents).
Let Atm be a countably infinite set {p, q, . . .} of propositional atoms, and let Agt be
a finite set {1, . . . , n} of agents. The language LT-STIT(Atm,Agt) of the logic T-STIT
is the set of formulae defined by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [i]ϕ | [Agt ]ϕ | ϕ | Gϕ | Hϕ
where p ranges over Atm and i ranges over Agt . The other Boolean constructions ⊤, ⊥,
∨, → and ↔ are defined from ¬ and ∧ in the standard way. Operators of the form [i]
are so-called Chellas’ STIT operators, named after their proponent [8].6 The formula
[i]ϕ has to be read ‘agent i ensures ϕ regardless of what the other agents do’, or—more
briefly—‘agent i sees to it that ϕ’. [Agt ] is a group STIT operator and [Agt ]ϕ has to
be read ‘all agents see to it that ϕ by acting together’. The duals of [i] and [Agt ] are
〈i〉 and 〈Agt〉, respectively.
 is the usual necessity (or inevitability) operator, with ϕ reading ‘ϕ is necessarily
true’. Its dual is ♦, with ♦ϕ reading ‘it is possibly true that ϕ’. Finally, G and H are
tense operators from linear temporal logic. Gϕ means ‘ϕ will always be true in the
future’ and Hϕ means ‘ϕ has always been true in the past’. Their duals are F and P,
respectively. Fϕ reads ‘ϕ will be true at least once in the future’ and Pϕ reads ‘ϕ was
true at least once in the past’.
Combinations of the above operators allows for interesting expressive power. For
instance, [i]Fϕ expresses the situations where ‘agent i sees to it that ϕ will be true
at least once’. One advantage of temporal STIT is that it can express a gap in time
between choice and outcome (see example above). It is reasonable to assume such a
gap, but atemporal STIT has no way to express it. Also, presence of , G and H makes
LT-STIT an extension of the language from [24, 25] for branching-time logic.
5It is also worth mentioning Wo¨lf [30], that studies an alternative semantics based on so-called
T ×W -based agent frames, which are extensions of the T ×W -frames studied in [27]. Such frames
can be described as Kamp frames that have the same temporal order for all the different worlds (or
‘histories’). We do not consider the proposal in [30] here, since T ×W -frames contain a mechanism of
synchronization of worlds that makes them extremely different from the non-synchronized branching-
time structure that we are studying here. An investigation of this option would take a full paper.
6More precisely, this is the name Belnap and Horty gave to the operator in [19], due to the similarities
with the operator introduced in [8].
♦[i]ϕ reads ‘agent i is able to see to it that ϕ. Notice that Chellas’ stit operator and
possibility operator together allows for the definition of the deliberative stit operator
(see [1]): [i dstit]ϕ = [i]ϕ ∧ ♦¬ϕ.
Our language LT-STIT is basically the language presented in [18], with the exception
of group operators, that we leave out in order to keep a balance between expressive power
and other formal properties. Indeed, [17] has proved that a STIT logic including the
group operators from [18] is not finitely axiomatizable. Inclusion of the grand coalition
operator [Agt ] is justified in light of this balance: T-STIT is finitely axiomatizable, as
proved in [20].
2.2 Temporal Kripke STIT frames
We first consider the semantics of T-STIT based on the notion of temporal Kripke
STIT frame, which was first introduced in [20]. The concept of a temporal Kripke STIT
frame extends Zanardo’s concept of an Ockhamist frame [31] with a choice component.
Ockhamist frames are one-sorted Kripke frames with an equivalence relation and a linear
temporal order imposed on points. The addition of relations of choice-equivalence makes
the frames suitable for modeling agency. The resulting semantics has the advantage of
being closer to the standard semantics of modal logic (first-order quantification over
point-like primitives) than the other semantics for temporal STIT.
For every set X, binary relation R on X and x ∈ X, let R(x) = {y ∈ X|xRy}.
Moreover, for all binary relations R1 and R2 on X, let R1 ◦ R2 be the composition of
R1 and R2.
7
Definition 1 (Temporal Kripke STIT frame) The class K of temporal Kripke STIT
frames (TKSFs, for short) includes all tuples
K = (X,R, {Ri}i∈Agt ,RAgt ,RG,RH) where:
• X is a nonempty set of points, which we will call time-points;
• R, every Ri and RAgt are equivalence relations between time-points in X such
that:
(C1) for all i ∈ Agt: Ri ⊆ R;
(C2) for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ X: if xiRxj for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} then
⋂
1≤i≤nRi(xi) 6=
∅; (remember that {1, . . . , n} = Agt)
(C3) for all x ∈ X: RAgt(x) =
⋂
i∈Agt Ri(x);
• RG and RH are binary relations between points in X such that RG is serial and
transitive, RH is the inverse relation of RG (i.e., RH = R
−1
G
= {(x, y)|yRGx}),
and:
(C4) for all x, y, z ∈ X: if y, z ∈ RG(x) then z ∈ RG(y) or y ∈ RG(z) or z = y;
(C5) for all x, y, z ∈ X: if y, z ∈ RH(x) then z ∈ RH(y) or y ∈ RH(z) or z = y;
(C6) RG ◦ R ⊆ RAgt ◦ RG;
7The composition R1 ◦ R2 of R1 and R2 is formally defined as {(x, y) ∈ X2 | ∃z ∈ X : R1(x, z)
and R2(z, y)}.
(C7) for all x, y ∈ X: if y ∈ R(x) then y 6∈ RG(x).
R(x) can be conceived as the set of time-points that are alternative to the time-point
x. An equivalence class R(x) is also called a moment. RG(x) defines the set of time-
points that are in the future of time-point x, and RH(x) is the set of time-points that
are in the past of time-point x.
Ri is a relation of choice-equivalence: xRiy means that x and y are compatible with
the very same choice of agent i. The set Ri(x) = {y ∈ X | xRiy} is the choice of agent
i at x. For every time-point x, the set RAgt(x) identifies the choice of group Agt at x.
Conditions C1–C3 and C6 define the concept of a choice. C1 states that an agent can
only choose among possible alternatives: if xRiy, then x and y are mutually alternative.
As a consequence, for every time-point x, Ri induces a partition of the set R(x). C2
expresses the so-called independence of agents : every choice of an agent i overlaps with
every choice of an agent j such that j 6= i. C3 defines the choice of all agents (at x)
as equal to the pointwise intersection of the individual choices of the agents in Agt (at
x).8 The principle is usually called additivity in the literature on STIT logic. Finally,
C6 guarantees that no choice can set apart two time-lines before they stop having time-
points x and y that are mutually alternative. This corresponds to the property of no
choice between undivided histories given in STIT logic [2, Chap. 7].
Conditions C4–C5 and C7 define the temporal order. C7 states that if two time-
points x and y are alternative one to another, then none of them can be in the future
of the other one. Due to the reflexivity of R, this implies that RG is irreflexive. Let
T (x) = RH(x) ∪ {x} ∪ RG(x) be the set of time-points that are temporally related
with time-point x. C4 and C5, together with the irreflexivity and transitivity of RG,
guarantee that RG is a strict linear order on the set T (x). For every time-point x in
X, we use ℓx as short for the linearly ordered set (T (x),RG) and set TL = {ℓx|x ∈ X}.
Notice that, if y ∈ RH(x) ∪ {x} ∪ RG(x), then ℓx = ℓy. Every time-line ℓx is infinite,
due to the seriality of RG. Due to the linearity of RG and RH, there is a functional
mapping from time-points to time-lines, as for every x ∈ X there exists exactly one
time-line ℓx ∈ TL that includes x.
A temporal Kripke STIT model (TKSM, for short) MK is a pair (K,V), where K
is a TKSF and V : Atm −→ 2X is a valuation function associating every atom with a
set of time-points. We assume that a TKSM satisfies the following condition:
(C8) for all x, y ∈ X and for all p ∈ Atm: if xRy then x ∈ V(p) iff y ∈ V(p).
C8 states that if two points belong to the same moment then they agree on the atoms.
It is worth noting that this condition is not assumed by [20] and, more generally, in the
context of STIT logic. However, it is generally assumed in the context of Prior’s Ock-
hamist branching-time logic (also called Prior’s Ockhamist logic of historical necessity)
[24, 25] and of Full Computation Tree Logic (CTL∗) [23]. In particular, under condition
C8, Prior’s Ockhamist branching time logic (OBTL) as defined by Reynolds in [24, 25]
is nothing but the fragment of T-STIT without the individual agency operators [i] and
the group agency operator [Agt ].
8This corresponds to the notion of joint action proposed by Horty in [18], where the joint action of
a group is described in terms of the result that the agents in the group bring about by acting together.
Relative to TKSMs, the truth conditions for formulae in LT-STIT are defined as
follows.
MK, x |= p ⇔ x ∈ V(p)
MK, x |= ¬ϕ ⇔ MK, x 6|= ϕ
MK, x |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ MK, x |= ϕ and MK, x |= ψ
MK, x |= ϕ ⇔ ∀y ∈ R(x) :M
K, y |= ϕ
MK, x |= [i]ϕ ⇔ ∀y ∈ Ri(x) :M
K, y |= ϕ
MK, x |= [Agt ]ϕ ⇔ ∀y ∈ RAgt(x) :M
K, y |= ϕ
MK, x |= Gϕ ⇔ ∀y ∈ RG(x) :M
K, y |= ϕ
MK, x |= Hϕ ⇔ ∀y ∈ RH(x) :M
K, y |= ϕ
The notions of validity and satisfiability are defined as usual. We use |=K to denote
TKSF-validity. The semantics of T-STIT is exemplified in Figure 1. In the TKSM
MK represented there, x is a given point, and the (big) thick rectangles are classes of
alternatives of given points—thus, for instance, the thick rectangle at the center of the
figure is the class R(x) of the alternatives of x. The choices of agents 1 and 2 are
represented by columns and rows, respectively—thus, for instance, the column includ-
ing x is the choice R1(x) of agent 1 at point x, and the row including x is the choice
R2(x) of agent 2 at point x. The (small) dotted rectangles represent the choices of
all agents (1 and 2) together—thus for instance, the dotted rectangle around x is the
choice RAgt(x) = R{1,2}(x) of agents 1 and 2 at point x. Arrows represent the temporal
relation RG. As it is easy to check, M
K, x |= [2]p, since p holds at every time-point in
agent 2’s choice at x. AlsoMK, x |= [1](p∨ q), because either p or q hold at every point
in agent 1’s choice at x.
In our setting, all the axioms of Linear Time Logic LTL hold for G, H and their duals,
and that the axioms of S5 hold for , [i] and [Agt ]. The axiomatization of T-STIT in
Subsection 2.5 includes such axioms, together with important principles for agency and
its connection with time and necessity. We just highlight some of them here.
Formula F♦ϕ→ 〈Agt〉Fϕ corresponds to C6 (no choice between undivided histories).
The operator [Agt ] in turn proves indispensable to express the condition, which provides
the rationale for introducing it here.
Formula (♦[1]ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ♦[n]ϕn) → ♦([1]ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ [n]ϕn) corresponds to C2 and
expresses the independence of agency. The compatibility of all the choices of an agent
with all choices of the other agent is in turn illustrated in Figure 1, where each choice
of 1 at x overlaps with each choice of 2 at some time-point that is alternative to x.
Formula ([1]ϕ1∧. . .∧[n]ϕn)→ [Agt ](ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn) corresponds to the condition that,
for all x ∈ X : RAgt(x) ⊆
⋂
i∈Agt Ri(x). The condition is known as superadditivity. Our
definition of TKSFs includes the stricter condition C3, (additivity) imposing RAgt(x) =⋂
i∈Agt Ri(x) for all x ∈ X. This does not make a difference with respect to our axiom,
however. Indeed, it is proved in [20, Lemma 9, p. 381] that, given our language LT-STIT,
we obtain the same notion of validity if we consider TKSFs from Definition 1 and if we
replace C3 with superaddivity in Definition 1. Finally, ϕ→ [i]ϕ corresponds to C1.
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Figure 1: Example of TKSM
2.3 Kamp agent frames
We now consider a semantics for T-STIT based on the Kamp frames that are discussed in
[27] and attributed to Hans Kamp. These frames include times and worlds as primitives,
and each world is provided with its own (linear) temporal structure.
Contrary to the other structures we investigate here, Kamp frames have been paid
little attention in the STIT literature—an exception is [2], where the descriptive ade-
quacy of Kamp frames as models for time is discussed. That notwithstanding, Kamp
frames enjoy interesting logical features. In particular, Kamp frames are two-sorted
structures that allow for first-order quantification over their main entities. This is a
very convenient feature, since first-order theories are more technically tractable than
second-order theories. Due to this, we believe that Kamp agent frames are worth in-
vestigating as mathematical models for agency, and deserve consideration.
Definition 2 (Kamp agent frame) The class F of Kamp agent frames includes all
tuples F = (W,O, {∼t}t∈T , {∼〈t,i〉}t∈T,i∈Agt , {∼〈t,Agt〉}t∈T ) where:
• W is a non-empty set of worlds;
• O is a function mapping every world w in W to an infinite9 linearly ordered
set 〈Tw, <w〉, where <w is a linear ordering on Tw. As usual, we let >w be
the inverse relation of <w. Also, we define T =
⋃
w∈W Tw and for all t ∈ T ,
Wt = {w ∈W |t ∈ Tw};
9The fact that every set Tw is infinite corresponds to the seriality of the relation RG in the definition
of TKSF.
• for all t ∈ T and for all i ∈ Agt, ∼t, ∼〈t,i〉 and ∼〈t,Agt〉 are equivalence relations
on Wt that satisfy the following four constraints:
(TW1) for all t ∈ T and for all i ∈ Agt: ∼〈t,i〉 ⊆ ∼t;
(TW2) for all t ∈ T and for all w1, . . . , wn ∈ W : if wi ∼t wj for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . , n} then
⋂
1≤i≤n ∼〈t,i〉(wi) 6= ∅;
(TW3) for all t ∈ T and for all w ∈W : ∼〈t,Agt〉(w) =
⋂
i∈Agt ∼〈t,i〉(w);
(TW4) for all t, t′ ∈ T and for all w,w′ ∈ W : if t <w t
′ and w ∼t′ w
′, then
w ∼〈t,Agt〉 w
′.
For every time t, w ∼t w
′ states that w and w′ match at t. What we have here is a
number of world-relative temporal orders determined by <w; the different worlds in W
are related together on the ground of (shared) temporal orders. w ∼〈t,i〉 w
′ reads ‘w
is choice-equivalent to w′ at t for i,’ and w ∼〈t,Agt〉 w
′ reads ‘w is choice-equivalent to
w′ at t for Agt .’ Thus, ∼〈t,i〉(w) and ∼〈t,Agt〉(w) are the choice of i at t which includes
w and the collective choice of all agents at t which includes w, respectively. TW1–
TW3 are the Kamp-counterparts of Constraints C1–C3 in Definition 1, and TW4 is the
counterpart of no choice between undivided histories (Constraint C7): if two worlds
match at a later time t′, they are now in the same choice of Agt . TW1, TW3 and TW4
together imply that, if t <w t
′ and w ∼t′ w
′, then w ∼t w
′.10 Thus, our construction of
Agt ’s choices and the choices of the agents is enough to guarantee that, if matching at
a time t, different worlds also match at any previous time. Also, the three conditions
imply that, if w ∼t w
′, then {t′|t′ ∈ Tw and t
′ <w t} = {t
′|t′ ∈ Tw′ and t
′ <w′ t}. This
guarantees that if two worlds match at t, the times earlier than t at w are the same as
the times earlier than t at w′. This in turn guarantees the weaker condition that the
orderings of w and w′ are isomorphic at least up to t.
Notice that it is possible to replace additivity in Kamp agent frames (the equality
condition in TW3 below) with superadditivity by imposing the weaker ‘subset condition’
∼〈t,Agt〉(w) ⊆ ∼〈t,i〉(w) (the choice of the grand coalition is equal or smaller than the
overlap of the choices of all the agents). This condition is in turn the counterpart in
Kamp agents frames of RAgt(x) ⊆
⋂
i∈Agt Ri(x) from Section 2.2. Theorem 1 and [20,
Lemma 9, p. 381] make it clear that this difference has no impact on the interpretation
of LT-STIT: the Kamp agent frames including additivity and those including superad-
ditivity are equivalent with respect to our language.
A Kamp agent model MF is a pair (F , π), where F is a Kamp agent frame and
π : Atm −→ 2T is a valuation function associating every atom with a set of times (those
at which the atom is true). Formulae of LT-STIT are evaluated w.r.t. a Kamp agent
10This is compatible with w and w′ not matching at a later time: as time goes on, two worlds can
stop matching. Thus, two worlds that are mutually alternative now can have different futures, but
they share their past.
model MF and a time-world pair 〈t, w〉 in MF such that t ∈ Tw:
MF , 〈t, w〉 |= p ⇔ t ∈ π(p)
MF , 〈t, w〉 |= ¬ϕ ⇔ MF , 〈t, w〉 6|= ϕ
MF , 〈t, w〉 |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ MF , 〈t, w〉 |= ϕ and MF , 〈t, w〉 |= ψ
MF , 〈t, w〉 |= ϕ ⇔ ∀w′ ∈W : if w ∼t w
′ then MF , 〈t, w′〉 |= ϕ
MF , 〈t, w〉 |= [i]ϕ ⇔ ∀w′ ∈W : if w ∼〈t,i〉 w
′ then MF , 〈t, w′〉 |= ϕ
MF , 〈t, w〉 |= [Agt ]ϕ ⇔ ∀w′ ∈W : if w ∼〈t,Agt〉 w
′ then MF , 〈t, w′〉 |= ϕ
MF , 〈t, w〉 |= Gϕ ⇔ ∀t′ ∈ T : if t <w t
′ then MF , 〈t′, w〉 |= ϕ
MF , 〈t, w〉 |= Hϕ ⇔ ∀t′ ∈ T : if t >w t
′ then MF , 〈t′, w〉 |= ϕ
Validity and satisfiability are defined as usual, with |=F ϕ denoting the fact that a
formula ϕ is valid relative to the class of Kamp agent models.
2.4 Choice b-trees
We now consider choice b-trees, which were first introduced in [9]. Such structures are
based on bundled trees of temporal logics, which [9] augments with agent-relative rela-
tions. The structures we are presenting here generalize those from [9] in three respects.
First, they include many agents and the grand coalition Agt , while [9] considers only
structures with one agent. Second, we assume that choice b-trees have no root (i.e., no
≺-first element for the relation ≺ below). Third, we do not impose any constraint on
the cardinality of time, while the structures in [9] impose discreteness.11 The upgrade to
a multi-agent setting is just a natural extension of the setting presented in [9], and the
generalization to structures having no root is justified by the convenient logical prop-
erties that this guarantees when past operators are accounted for. Theorem 1 below
easily applies to the discrete-time versions of temporal STIT frames and our generalized
choice b-trees, and thus we will not pursue a focused formal comparison between such
structures here.
Bundled trees impose a selection over the histories of (full) trees T = (M,≺), where
M is a non-empty set of moments and ≺ is a serial, irreflexive, transitive and past-linear
relation on M . We first introduce trees, bundles and bundled trees, and we then define
choice b-trees.
Definition 3 (Trees) A (full) tree is a tuple T = (M,≺), where:
• M is a non-empty set of moments;
• ≺ is a relation on M that is serial, irreflexive, transitive and past-linear (i.e.,
for all m,m′,m′′ ∈ M if m′ ≺ m and m′′ ≺ m then m′ = m′′ or m′ ≺ m′′ or
m′′ ≺ m′). We let ≻ be the inverse relation of ≺.
11Also, we replace the function of choice with choice-equivalence classes, with a move that is usual
in STIT logics and will have no bearings in what follows.
The notion of a history is also crucial in such structures:
Definition 4 (Histories) Histories are sets h, h′, . . . of moments that are linearly or-
dered by ≺ and are maximal for inclusion. HT is the set of all histories in the tree
T, and Hm is the set of histories h such that m ∈ h (the histories “passing through
m”)—we omit reference to the given tree, in this case.
Definition 5 (Bundles) B is a bundle on T iff B ⊆ HT, and
(B0) for every m ∈M , there is a history h ∈ B such that m ∈ h.12
We write Bm to denote the set of histories in B which pass through m, that is B ∩Hm.
Condition B0 ensures that B ∩Hm 6= ∅. A bundled tree is a pair (T, B) where T is a
tree and B is a bundle on T.13 We are now ready to define choice b-trees.
Definition 6 (Choice b-trees) The class B of choice b-trees include all tuples B =
(T, B, {∼〈m,i〉}m∈M,i∈Agt , {∼〈m,Agt〉}m∈M ) where:
• (T, B) is a bundled tree;
• for all m ∈ M and for all i ∈ Agt, ∼〈m,i〉 and ∼〈m,Agt〉 are equivalence relations
on Bm that satisfy the following conditions:
(B1) for all m ∈M and for all h1, . . . , hn ∈ Bm:
⋂
1≤i≤n ∼〈m,i〉(hi) 6= ∅;
(B2) for all m ∈M and for all h ∈ Bm: ∼〈m,Agt〉(h) =
⋂
i∈Agt ∼〈m,i〉(h);
(B3) for all m,m′ ∈ M and for all h, h′ ∈ B: if m ≺ m′ and h, h′ ∈ Bm′ , then
h, h′ ∈ Bm and h ∼〈m,Agt〉 h
′.
∼〈m,i〉 and ∼〈m,Agt〉 read ‘h is choice-equivalent to h
′ for agent i at m’ and ‘h is choice-
equivalent to h′ for Agt at m,’ respectively. B1–B2 are the counterparts of Constraints
C2–C3 in Definition 1, while B3 is the counterpart of C6.
Again, we can replace additivity (condition B2) with superadditivity by imposing the
weaker condition ∼〈m,Agt〉(h) ⊆
⋂
i∈Agt ∼〈m,i〉(h). Theorem 2 and [20, Lemma 9, p.
381] secure that this does not change the logic: the choice b-trees including additivity
and those including superadditivity are equivalent with respect to our language.
A choice b-modelMB is a pair (B, υ), where B is a choice b-tree and υ : Atm −→ 2M
is a valuation function associating atoms with sets of moments. Formulae of LT-STIT
are evaluated w.r.t. a choice b-model MB and a moment-history pair 〈m,h〉 in MB
12The usual definition of a bundle allows for branches, that is possibly non-maximal ≺-chains of
moments to be considered, and it then imposes that, if a branch is in a bundle, then all its sub-
branches and all its linear extensions are in the bundle. We do not need to impose the latter in our
definition, since we are defining bundles in terms of maximal ≺-chains of moments.
13It is clear by Definitions 3 and 5 that full trees T are a limit-case of bundled trees, namely those
bundled trees where Bm = Hm for every m ∈M .
such that h ∈ B and m ∈ h:
MB, 〈m,h〉 |= p ⇔ m ∈ υ(p)
MB, 〈m,h〉 |= ¬ϕ ⇔ MB, 〈m,h〉 6|= ϕ
MB, 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ MB, 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ and MB, 〈m,h〉 |= ψ
MB, 〈m,h〉 |= ϕ ⇔ ∀h′ ∈ Bm :M
B, 〈m,h′〉 |= ϕ
MB, 〈m,h〉 |= [i]ϕ ⇔ ∀h′ ∈ Bm : if h ∼〈m,i〉 h
′ then MB, 〈m,h′〉 |= ϕ
MB, 〈m,h〉 |= [Agt ]ϕ ⇔ ∀h′ ∈ Bm : if h ∼〈m,Agt〉 h
′ then MB, 〈m,h′〉 |= ϕ
MB, 〈m,h〉 |= Gϕ ⇔ ∀m′ ∈ h : if m ≺ m′ then MB, 〈m′, h〉 |= ϕ
MB, 〈m,h〉 |= Hϕ ⇔ ∀m′ ∈ h : if m ≻ m′ then MB, 〈m′, h〉 |= ϕ
Validity and satisfiability are defined as usual, with |=B ϕ denoting the fact that a
formula ϕ is valid relative to the class of choice b-models.
The traditional BT+AC structures for STIT logics given by Belnap et al. [2] are
based on full trees. As we have already mentioned, a full tree is a bundled tree such
that its bundle B coincides with the set HT of histories in the tree. Thus, full trees are
presupposed by bundled trees and, conceptually, more basic than the latter. Here we
consider a version of BT+ACs that includes the individual choices of many agents and
the collective choices of the set Agt of all the agents. Also, we will consider a relational
version of the structures. This will bring no real deflection from BT+ACs: it is easy
to see that the equivalence relations for choice naturally induce a function of choice as
defined in [2, Def. 11], and vice versa (an example of this is [2, Def. 12, p. 214]).
The presentation of BT+AC structures—BT+ACs, for short—is extremely simple,
since the only difference with choice b-trees is in the fact that Bm = Hm for allm ∈M—
that is, we simply need to drop B and extend our consideration to all maximal ≺-chains
defined in T.
Definition 7 (BT + AC’s) The class T of BT + AC’s includes all those choice b-
trees B such that B = HT.
A BT+AC model is a choice-b model (B, υ) such that B is a BT+AC. The truth
conditions for the formulae in LT-STIT w.r.t. BT+AC models obtain from the truth
conditions w.r.t. choice b-models by substituting any occurrence of Bm with Hm.
2.5 Equivalence between the three semantics
The following theorems highlight that the semantics based on Kamp agent frames, that
based on TKSFs and that based on bundled trees are equivalent w.r.t. LT-STIT.
Theorem 1 Let ϕ be a T-STIT formula. Then, |=K ϕ iff |=F ϕ.
Theorem 2 Let ϕ be a T-STIT formula. Then, |=K ϕ iff |=B ϕ.
PC All tautologies of classical propositional calculus
S5(i) All S5-principles for the operators [i]
S5() All S5-principles for the operator 
S5(Agt) All S5-principles for the operator [Agt ]
KD4(G) All KD4-principles for the operator G
K(H) All K-principles for the operator H
(→ i) ϕ→ [i]ϕ
(i→ Agt) ([1]ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ [n]ϕn)→ [Agt ](ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn)
(AIA) (♦[1]ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ♦[n]ϕn)→ ♦([1]ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ [n]ϕn)
(ConvG,H) ϕ→ GPϕ
(ConvH,G) ϕ→ HFϕ
(ConnectedG) PFϕ→ (Pϕ ∨ ϕ ∨ Fϕ)
(ConnectedH) FPϕ→ (Pϕ ∨ ϕ ∨ Fϕ)
(NCUH) F♦ϕ→ 〈Agt〉Fϕ
(AtmMom) p→ p if p ∈ Atm
(MP)
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
(IRR)
(¬p ∧ (Gp ∧ Hp))→ ϕ
ϕ
, provided p does not occur in ϕ
Figure 2: Axiomatization of T-STIT
As with any other theorem of the paper, the proofs are presented in Appendix A, but
we give a hint of the proof strategy here. Our proofs establish, first, that every Kamp
agent model and every choice b-tree model determine a TKSM, and vice-versa and,
second, that the correspondences preserve satisfiability. In a nutshell, we obtain the
equivalence result among the different notions of validity by establishing a stronger
result of correspondence among structures. We will use the same strategy of proof for
Theorem 3 in Section 3.
As proved in [20, Lemma 9, p. 381], the notion of validity of the language LT-STIT
relative to TKSFs of Definition 1 and the notion of validity of LT-STIT relative to su-
peradditive TKSFs—in which the condition C3 is replaced by the weaker condition
RAgt(x) ⊆ Ri(x)—are equivalent. Moreover, it is trivial to adapt the proof of Theorem
1 to show that the notion of validity of LT-STIT relative to superadditive TKSFs and the
notion of validity of LT-STIT relative to superadditive Kamp agent frames— in which
the condition TW3 is replaced by the weaker condition ∼〈t,Agt〉 (w) ⊆ ∼〈t,i〉 (w)—are
equivalent. Consequently, as we have emphasized in Section 2.3, the notion of validity
relative to TKSFs and the notion of validity relative to superadditive TKSFs are equiv-
alent when considering the language LT-STIT.
Figure 2 presents an axiomatization of T-STIT that is sound and complete w.r.t.
to TKSFs. A proof of the completeness theorem can be found in [20].14 An interesting
14[20] proves completeness for a version of T-STIT that does not satisfy condition C8. The proof
provided there can be easily adjusted in such a way that the resulting canonical model satisfies the
aspect of this axiomatization is that it exploits a variant of the Gabbay’s irreflexivity rule
that has been widely used in the past for proving completeness results for different kinds
of temporal logic in which time is supposed to be irreflexive (see, e.g., [13, 31, 25, 28]).
The idea of the irreflexivity rule (IRR) is that the special kind of irreflexivity for the
relation RG expressed by the Constraint C7 in Definition 1, although not definable in
terms of an axiom, can be characterized in an alternative sense by means of the rule
(IRR). This rule is perhaps more comprehensible if we consider its contrapositive: if
¬ϕ is satisfiable and p does not occur in ϕ, then ¬p ∧(Gp ∧ Hp) ∧ ¬ϕ is satisfiable
as well, because the temporal relation is irreflexive. Thus, (IRR) preserves validity.
An immediate consequence of Theorems 1 and 2 is that the axiomatization in Fig-
ure 2 is sound and complete also w.r.t. to Kamp agent frames and choice b-trees.
3 An interpreted system semantics for T-STIT
In this section we define a semantics for temporal STIT based on Fagin et al.’s notion
of interpreted system [12]. The notion of interpreted system has been widely employed
to provide semantics for epistemic temporal logics. We show that this semantics is
equivalent to the temporal STIT semantics in terms of discrete temporal Kripke STIT
frames with initial point.
The following definition introduces the basic components of interpreted systems.
Definition 8 (Global states, runs and systems) Le is the set of possible (local)
states for the environment and L1, . . . , Ln are the sets of local states for the agents.
G ⊆ Le × L1 × . . .× Ln is a set of global states. A run over G is a function from the
natural numbers to G. Runs are denoted by symbols r, r′, . . . We write ri(k) to denote
the local state of agent i at the global state r(k) and re(k) to denote the local state of
the environment at the global state r(k). A system S over G is a set of runs over G.
Given a system S, we call P = S × N the set of points.
In the context of STIT, the set Li of local states for agent i should be conceived as the
set of actions that agent i can choose (i.e., agent i’s action repertoire).
An interpreted system is nothing but a system supplemented with a valuation func-
tion that specifies the set of points in which a given propositional atom p is true.
Definition 9 (Interpreted system) The class of interpreted systems includes all
tuples I = (S, ω) where S is a system and ω is a valuation function ω : Atm −→ 2P .
The following definition introduces equivalence relations for the agents and for the
environment.
Definition 10 (Equivalence relations for agents and the environment) Let I =
(S, ω) be an interpreted system. Then, the equivalence relations ≡e and ≡i on P for
the environment and for agent i are defined as follows. For all (r, k), (r′, k′) ∈ P:
• (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) iff re(k) = r
′
e(k
′) and k = k′,
condition that propositions are moment-determinate. This suffices to adapt the proof from [20] to the
version of T-STIT that we present in this paper.
• (r, k) ≡i (r
′, k′) iff (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) and ri(k) = r
′
i(k
′),
• (r, k) ≡Agt (r
′, k′) iff (r, k) ≡i (r
′, k′) for all i ∈ Agt.
where (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) means that the environment is the same at (r, k) and (r′, k′).
Moreover, for all i ∈ Agt , (r, k) ≡i (r
′, k′) means that (r, k) and (r′, k′) are choice-
equivalent for agent i. Note that the equivalence relation ≡e for the environment is
completely determined by the local state of the environment and the time,15 whereas the
equivalence relation≡i for an agent i is determined by the local state of the environment,
the time and the local state of the agent. In other words, (r, k) and (r′, k′) are choice-
equivalent for agent i if and only if, the environment, the time and i’s choice are the
same at (r, k) and (r′, k′).
In order to provide an interpreted system semantics for temporal STIT, we need the
following three properties.
Definition 11 (Environment determinacy) The interpreted system I = (S, ω) sat-
isfies environment determinacy iff:
for all (r, k), (r′, k′) ∈ P and for all p ∈ Atm, if (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) then (r, k) ∈ ω(p) iff
(r′, k′) ∈ ω(p).
Definition 12 (Choice independence) The interpreted system I = (S, ω) satisfies
choice independence iff:
for all (r1, k1), . . . , (rn, kn) ∈ P, if (ri, ki) ≡e (rj , kj) for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} then⋂
1≤i≤n ≡i (ri, ki) 6= ∅.
Definition 13 (No choice between undivided runs) The interpreted system I =
(S, ω) satisfies no choice between undivided runs iff:
for all (r, k), (r′, k′) ∈ P, if (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) and h < k then there exists h′ < k′ such
that (r, h) ≡Agt (r
′, h′).
Note that the previous property of no choice between undivided runs implies that if
(r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) and k, k′ > 0, then (r, k − 1) ≡Agt (r
′, k′ − 1). More generally, we have
that if (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) and k, k′ ≥ h > 0 then (r, k − h) ≡Agt (r
′, k′ − h). Since by
Definition 10 (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) implies k = k′, we also have that if (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) and
k, k′ ≥ h > 0 then (r, k − h) ≡Agt (r
′, k′ − h) and k − h = k′ − h.
Environment determinacy is the counterpart of Constraint C8 in the definition of
TKSM. It states that if the environment is the same at two points, then the two points
agree on the atoms. In this sense, the environment determines the truth values of the
atoms. Choice independence and no choice between undivided runs are respectively the
counterparts of Constraints C2 and C6 in the definition of TKSM.
The following definition introduces the concept of STIT interpreted system.
Definition 14 (STIT interpreted system) A STIT interpreted system is an inter-
preted system I = (S, ω) that satisfies environment determinacy, choice independence
and no choice between undivided runs.
15The equivalence relation ≡e depends on time since we assume that a complete description of the
environment includes a specification of its temporal properties.
The truth conditions for formulae in LT-STIT w.r.t. STIT interpreted systems are
defined as follows:
(I, r, k) |= p ⇔ (r, k) ∈ ω(p)
(I, r, k) |= ¬ϕ ⇔ (I, r, k) 6|= ϕ
(I, r, k) |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ (I, r, k) |= ϕ and (I, r, k) |= ψ
(I, r, k) |= ϕ ⇔ ∀(r′, k′) ∈ P : if (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′) then (I, r′, k′) |= ϕ
(I, r, k) |= [i]ϕ ⇔ ∀(r′, k′) ∈ P : if (r, k) ≡i (r
′, k′) then (I, r′, k′) |= ϕ
(I, r, k) |= [Agt ]ϕ ⇔ ∀(r′, k′) ∈ P : if (r, k) ≡Agt (r
′, k′) then (I, r′, k′) |= ϕ
(I, r, k) |= Gϕ ⇔ ∀k′ ∈ N : if k′ > k then (I, r, k′) |= ϕ
(I, r, k) |= Hϕ ⇔ ∀k′ ∈ N : if k′ < k then (I, r, k′) |= ϕ
We compare STIT interpreted systems with a specific subclass of temporal Kripke
STIT models, namely the class of temporal Kripke STIT models with discrete time and
initial point.
Definition 15 (Temporal Kripke STIT model with discrete time and initial point)
A temporal Kripke STIT frame with discrete time and initial point (DTKSM) is a tuple
MDK = (X,R, {Ri}i∈Agt ,RAgt ,RX,V) where:
• X is a nonempty set of time-points;
• R, every Ri and RAgt are equivalence relations on X, RX is a serial and deter-
ministic relation on X;
and which satisfies the Constraints C1, C2, C3, C6, C7 and C8 in the definition of
TKSM, namely:
(C1) for all i ∈ Agt: Ri ⊆ R;
(C2) for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ X: if xiRxj for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
then
⋂
1≤i≤nRi(xi) 6= ∅;
(C3) for all x ∈ X: RAgt(x) =
⋂
i∈Agt Ri(x);
(C6) RG ◦ R ⊆ RAgt ◦ RG;
(C7) for all x, y ∈ X: if y ∈ R(x) then y 6∈ RG(x);
(C8) for all x, y ∈ X and for all p ∈ Atm: if xRy then x ∈ V(p) iff y ∈ V(p);
plus the fact that RY is deterministic and the following constraint:
(C9) for all x ∈ X: there exists y ∈ RH(x) such that RH(y) = ∅;
where RG = R
+
X
is the transitive closure of RX, RH is the inverse relation of RG and
RY is the inverse relation of RX.
The main difference between TKSMs and DTKSMs is that in the latter the accessibility
relation for the future RG is built from the accessibility relation RX for the ‘next’ time
point. In particular, the accessibility relation for the future is defined to be the transitive
closure of the accessibility relation for the ‘next’ operator. Note that the relation RX
is serial and deterministic because every point is assumed to have exactly one temporal
successor. Furthermore, note that the previous Constraint C6 implies the following
property:
(C10) for all x, y ∈ X: if xRy and RH(x) = ∅ then RH(y) = ∅.
The previous Constraints C6 and C7 together with the fact that RY is deterministic
imply the following property:
(C11) RX ◦ R ⊆ RAgt ◦ RX.
Finally, by the Constraint C1 and C3 together with the previous properties C10 and
C11, we can prove by induction that the following property holds:
(C12) for all x, y ∈ X: if xRy then there exists x
′, y′ ∈ X and k ∈ N such that
xRk
Y
x′, yRk
Y
y′ and RH(x
′) = RH(y
′) = ∅,
where Rk
Y
is the k-composition of the relation RY defined inductively by (i) R
0
Y
=
{(x, x)|x ∈ X}, and (ii) Rk+1
Y
= Rk
Y
◦ RY = RY ◦ R
k
Y
.
Condition C12 tells that two points in the same moment are associated with the 
same time. Notice that the condition corresponds to property k = k′ in the definition 
of the equivalence relations ≡e from Definition 10.
Truth conditions of formulae relative to DTKSMs are the same as truth conditions 
of formulae relative to TKSMs given in Section 2.2.
Let |=I ϕ and |=DK ϕ denote that formula ϕ is valid relative to STIT interpreted sys-
tems and valid relative to DTKSMs, respectively. As the following theorem highlights, 
these two notions of validity are equivalent.
Theorem 3 Let ϕ be a T-STIT formula. Then, |=I ϕ iff |=DK ϕ.
The previous result can be easily generalized to the class of discrete Kamp agent frames 
and to the class of discrete choice b-trees. The class of discrete Kamp agent frames 
includes all Kamp agent frames of Definition 2 satisfying the extra-condition that every 
ordered set 〈Tw, <w〉 is isomorphic to the set of natural numbers. Similarly, the class 
of discrete choice b-trees includes all choice b-trees of Definition 6 satisfying the extra-
condition that every history h is isomorphic to the set of natural numbers. From the 
class of discrete choice b-trees, the class of discrete BT+AC structures is easily defined 
by taking every discrete choice b-tree whose bundle coincides with the set of all histories. 
Let |=DF ϕ and |=DB ϕ denote that formula ϕ is valid relative to discrete Kamp agent 
frames and valid relative to discrete choice b-trees, respectively.
As the following two theorems highlight, DTKSMs, discrete Kamp agent frames 
and discrete choice b-trees provide equivalent semantics for the language LT-STIT. The 
proofs of these two theorems follow the general lines of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 
given in the appendix. Thus, we do not give them here.
Theorem 4 Let ϕ be a T-STIT formula. Then, |=DK ϕ iff |=DF ϕ.
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Figure 3: Summary of relationships between semantics
Theorem 5 Let ϕ be a T-STIT formula. Then, |=DK ϕ iff |=DB ϕ.
The previous Theorems 3, 4 and 5 together highlight the equivalence between the four
semantics w.r.t. LT-STIT, namely the semantics in terms of DTKSMs, discrete Kamp
agent frames, discrete choice b-trees and STIT interpreted systems.
4 Summary of the results
Figure 3 summarizes the relationships between the different semantics for T-STIT stud-
ied in the paper. The left side of the figure highlights the equivalence between the three
semantics in terms of TKSMs, Kamp agent models and choice b-models. The right side
highlights the equivalence between the different semantics for T-STIT in which time
is assumed to be discrete. The inclusion between the two sides shows that the set of
validities obtaining in the semantics from the left side is included in the set of validities
obtaining in the semantics from the right side.
The figure also highlights that the set of validities for the semantics with not nec-
essarily discrete time is strictly included in the set of validities for the semantics with
discrete time. The following is an example of a formula of the language LT-STIT which
is valid with respect to the discrete-time semantics presented in Section 3, in which
the temporal order is isomorphic to the natural numbers, but which is not valid with
respect to the semantics with not necessarily discrete time:
(ϕ ∧ Hϕ)→ FHϕ (1)
It is worth noting that while DTKSM-validity coincides with validity in discrete Kamp
agent models and discrete choice b-models, DTKSM-validity and validity in discrete
BT+AC models do not coincide. This immediately follows from the fact that bundled
trees and full trees do not validate exactly the same formulae involving G and . A
well-known example discussed in [7] is the following formula:
G(ϕ→ ♦Fϕ)→ ♦G(ϕ→ Fϕ) (2)
This formula is valid on full trees with discrete time, but not on bundled trees with
discrete time. Since the formula is also in LT-STIT(Atm,Agt), the result immediately
extends to discrete choice b-validity (DTKSM-validity, discrete Kamp agent-validity)
and discrete BT+AC validity. Figure 4 illustrates a DTKSM where G(ϕ → ♦Fϕ) →
♦G(ϕ→ Fϕ) fails.
 

   
   
  
 






Figure 4: Example of DTKSM that falsifies G(p→ ♦Fp)→ ♦G(p→ Fp)
In order to show that the preceding formula (2) is valid on discrete BT+ACs, assume
that MB, 〈m0, h〉 |= G(ϕ → ♦Fϕ) for an arbitrary discrete BT+AC model M
B,
moment m0 and history h passing through m0. This semantically means that:
(i) for all h′ ∈ Bm0 and for all m ∈ h
′ if m0 ≺ m and M
B, 〈m,h′〉 |= ϕ then there
exists h′′ ∈ Bm and m
′ ∈ h′′ such that m ≺ m′ and MB, 〈m′, h′′〉 |= ϕ.
We distinguish two cases. As for the the first case, let us assume that MB, 〈m0, h〉 |=
G¬ϕ. The latter implies MB, 〈m0, h〉 |= ♦G¬ϕ which in turn implies M
B, 〈m0, h〉 |=
♦G(ϕ → Fϕ). As for the second case, let us assume that MB, 〈m0, h〉 |= ♦Fϕ, which
semantically means:
(ii) there exists h′ ∈ Bm0 and a lower set X of F(h
′,m0) such that X has order type
1 and MB, 〈m, h′〉 |= Fϕ for all m ∈ X,
where F(h′,m0) = ({m0}∪{m ∈ h′|m0 ≺ m}, ≺) and where X is a lower set of F(h′,m0) 
iff X is a subset of F(h′,m0) such that for all m ∈ X and for all m′ ∈ F(h′,m0), if 
m′ ≺ m then m′ ∈ X. For every k ∈ N, let
Zm0,k,ϕ
be the set of all pairs (h, X) such that h ∈ Bm0 , X is a lower set of F(h,m0) of order 
type k, and MB, 〈m, h〉 |= Fϕ for all m ∈ X.
Item (i) together with the fact that MB is a discrete BT+AC model based on a full 
tree imply that the following holds for every k ∈ N:
(iii) for every (h,X) ∈ Zm0,k,ϕ, there exists (h
′, X ′) ∈ Zm0,k+1,ϕ such that X ⊂ X
′.
Items (ii) and (iii), together with the axiom of choice, guarantee that we can find
h1, h2, . . . ∈ Bm0 and X1, X2, . . . ⊆M such that, for every k ∈ N:
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• Xk ⊂ Xk+1,
• Xk has order type k,
• Xk is a lower set of F(hk,m0), and
• MB, 〈m,hk〉 |= Fϕ for all m ∈ Xk.
Let
hX =
⋃
k∈N
Xk.
Clearly, hX is a history in Bm0 such that M
B, 〈m,hX〉 |= Fϕ for all m ∈ F(hX ,m0).
The latter means that MB, 〈m0, hX〉 |= GFϕ. From this, we get M
B, 〈m0, h〉 |= ♦GFϕ,
which in turn implies MB, 〈m0, h〉 |= ♦G(ϕ→ Fϕ).
Other examples of formulae of the language LT-STIT(Atm,Agt) that are valid on
discrete BT+AC models but not on DTKSMs, discrete Kamp agent models and discrete
choice b-models are the following variants of the previous formula (2) in which the
operator ♦ in the antecedent is replaced either by the operator 〈i〉 or by the operator
〈Agt〉:
G(ϕ→ 〈i〉Fϕ)→ ♦G(ϕ→ Fϕ) (3)
G(ϕ→ 〈Agt〉Fϕ)→ ♦G(ϕ→ Fϕ) (4)
5 Extension with full groups
As emphasized in Section 2.5, Lemma 9 from [20, p. 381] shows that we get the
same logic, namely T-STIT, if we impose superadditivity instead of additivity on the
construction of RAgt in TKSFs. Just to recall these notions: in TKSFs, the former
equates with the condition that, for all x ∈ X, RAgt(x) ⊆
⋂
i∈Agt Ri(x), while
the latter equates with the condition C3 from Definition 1 in Section 2.2: RAgt(x) =⋂
i∈Agt Ri(x) for all x ∈ X.
Things change if we extend TKSFs with choice-equivalence relations for all the
definable groups and corresponding group STIT operators, that is, all the members of
2Agt∗ = 2Agt \ ∅ in each TKSF. In this section, we briefly explore how this extension
affects the equivalence results from Subsection 2.5.
16The axiom of choice is used here to ensure that we can choose the element (h1, X1) from Zm0,1,ϕ, 
which is guaranteed to be non-empty because of item (ii). Moreover, for every k ∈ N, we use the 
axiom of choice to choose the element (hk, Xk) from the set {(h, X) ∈ Zm0,k,ϕ|Xk−1 ⊂ X}, which is 
guaranteed to be non-empty because of item (iii).
Let us extend LT-STIT with many group STIT operators [J ], [I], . . . , for the members 
J , I . . . of 2Agt∗ resulting into the following language
LT-GSTIT(Atm, Agt) of the logic T-GSTIT (temporal group STIT):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [J ]ϕ | ϕ | Gϕ | Hϕ
where p ranges over Atm and J ranges over 2Agt∗.
Moreover, let us define two classes of group TKSFs: additive group TKSFs and 
super-additive group TKSFs. Additive group TKSFs extend TKSFs of Definition 1 
with one relation RJ per group J in 2Agt∗ and generalize the condition C3 of Definition 
1 with the following condition:
(C3′) for all x ∈ X and J ∈ 2Agt∗: RJ (x) = 
⋂
i∈J Ri(x).
We denote the class of additive group TKSFs by AGK.
Super-additive TKSFs consists in generalizing the class of frames introduced in [5] 
with accessibility relations for the temporal operators G and H. Specifically, super-
additive group TKSFs extend TKSFs of Definition 1 with one relation RJ per group J 
after replacing the condition C1 with the following condition:
(C1′) for all J ∈ 2Agt∗: RJ ⊆ R,
and the condition C3 with the following two conditions:
(C3′′) for all I, J ∈ 2Agt∗: if I ⊆ J then RJ ⊆ RI ,
(C3′′′) for all J ∈ 2Agt∗ such that J 6= Agt : R ⊆ RJ ◦ RAgt\J .
We denote the class of super-additive group TKSFs by SGK.
Condition C1′ generalizes Condition C1 in Definition 1 to groups. Condition C3′′ is 
the condition of coalitional monotonicity meaning that bigger groups have finer choice 
partitions. Condition C3′′′ just means that every alternative can be attained by com-
bining the current choice of a group and the appropriate choice of its complement. 
Conditions C1′, C3′′ and C3′′′ are also properties of additive group TKSFs. Indeed, 
Condition C1′ is entailed by Condition C1 in Definition 1 and Condition C3′ above. 
Condition C3′′ is entailed by Condition C3′. Condition C3′′′ is entailed by Condition 
C2 in Definition 1, Condition C3′ above and the fact that every RJ is an equivalence 
relation. To prove this, suppose xRy and without loss of generality let J = {1, . . . , k} 
and Agt \ J = {k, . . . , n} with k < n. By Condition C2 in Definition 1, we have 
R1(x) ∩ . . . ∩ Rk(x) ∩ . . . ∩ Rk(y) ∩ . . . ∩ Rn(y) 6= ∅. By Condition C3′ the latter is 
equivalent to RJ (x) ∩ RAgt\J (y) 6= ∅. Since RJ and RAgt\J are equivalence relations, 
it follows that xRJ ◦ RAgt\J y. This shows that the class of additive group TKSFs is 
indeed a subclass of the class of super-additive group TKSFs.
Truth conditions of formulae of the language LT-GSTIT(Atm, Agt) are as the ones 
given in Section 2.2 for the boolean operators, the temporal operators and the operator 
 plus the following one for the group STIT operator [J ]:
Mτ , x |= [J ]ϕ ⇔ ∀y ∈ RJ (x) : M
τ , y |= ϕ
where τ is either AGK or SGK depending on whether we evaluate formulae relative to 
additive group TKSFs or to super-additive group TKSFs.
There exists an atemporal STIT formula which distinguishes additive group TKSFs
from super-additive ones. Specifically, the following formula is valid w.r.t. additive
group TKSFs and invalid w.r.t. super-additive group TKSFs:
[J ][I]ϕ→ [J ∩ I]ϕ (5)
The proof of the validity requires just a straightforward adaptation of the right-left di-
rection from [17, Theorem 13], to which we refer the reader. The following super-additive
group TKSM shows that the formula is invalid w.r.t. super-additive group TKSFs. Let
Agt = {1, 2, 3} and let Atm = {p}. Moreover, letMSGK = (X,R, {RJ}J∈2Agt∗ ,RG,RH)
be such that:
• X =
⋃
α∈NXα with Xα = {xα, yα} for all α ∈ N,
• R = R{1} = R{2} = R{3} = X1 ×X1 ∪
⋃
α>1{(xα, xα), (yα, yα)},
• R{1,2} = R{1,3} = R{2,3} = R{1,2,3} =
⋃
α∈N{(xα, xα), (yα, yα)},
• RG = {(xα, xβ)|α, β ∈ N and α ≤ β} ∪ RG = {(yα, yβ)|α, β ∈ N and α ≤ β},
• V(p) = {xα|α ∈ N}, and
• RH is the inverse relation of RG.
It easy to check that MSGK, x1 |= [{1, 2}][{1, 3}]p but M
SGK, x1 6|= [{1}]p.
Of course, we can adapt the definitions above to obtain additive and super-additive 
group Kamp agent frames and choice b-trees, respectively. It is straightforward to 
check that the previous observation also applies to the distinction between additive 
Kamp agent frames (choice b-trees) and super-additive Kamp agent frames (choice b-
trees), namely the fact that formula [J ][I]ϕ → [J ∩ I]ϕ is valid w.r.t. the former and 
invalid w.r.t. the latter.
Besides, it is easy to adapt the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 to the notions 
of validity in additive group TKSFs, additive group Kamp agent frames, additive group 
choice b-trees, and to the super-additive versions of such structures.
This implies that the equivalence results are preserved if the structures that we are 
taking into account are upgraded to choices of groups by adopting additivity (or super-
additivity) for all of them. By contrast, equivalence is lost if we compare any frame for 
group agency with additivity with frames with super-additivity.
This does not undermine the generality of our results, however. The comparison we 
carried in this paper aims at proving that we obtain the same logic if we vary over three 
different temporal structures while keeping the same principle of agency fixed. Thus, 
the fact that super-additivity and additivity determine two different logics does not 
affect the generality of the results we have established.
The full superadditive group STIT logic from [4] and the full additive group STIT 
logics based on LT-GSTIT enjoy different formal properties. Indeed, [4] presents a fi-
nite axiomatization of the former, whose decidability is still an open issue, while the 
latter is undecidable and not finitely axiomatizable [17]. Also, decidability of the full 
(superadditive) group logic from [4] is still an open issue.
It is easy to see why the negative results from [17] do not apply, as they stand, to
the superadditive logic from [4]. The results from [17] establish that, for k ≥ 3, the
product logic S5k can be embedded in an additive T-GSTIT with k ≥ 3 agents. Since
S5k is undecidable and not finitely axiomatizable for k ≥ 3, the embedding transfers
these properties to any T-GSTIT with k ≥ 3. By contrast, the group operators from [4]
are KD-type operators17 and do not verify the so-called Church-Rosser axiom, which
prevents them from embedding any product logic. This, the results from [17] have no
implications for the logic from [4].
Another open issue concerns the role that superadditivity and additivity are sup-
posed to play in the formal properties of the two logics. In particular, [26] conjectures
that a non-temporal fragment of full group T-GSTIT is decidable if and only if the
fragment does not capture the difference between additive and superadditive models.
If this is correct, then superadditive T-GSTIT should be undecidable. By contrast,
a conjecture from [21] is that the non-temporal fragment of superadditive T-GSTIT
should be decidable. Even if this would be true, however, the conjecture from [21]
presupposes a language that is weaker than LT-GSTIT, and then the conjecture has no
direct implications of the decidability of superadditive T-GSTIT. In light of this, we
feel that our choice to focus on the language LT-STIT rather than LT-GSTIT is justified.
6 Discussion
The alternative semantics from Section 2 are appealing because they are convenient
mathematical objects. Indeed, the semantics based on TKSFs quantifies over time-
points only, and that based on Kamp agent frames quantifies over times and worlds.
These entities are introduced as primitives, not as defined set-theoretical objects. As a
consequence, the two semantics keep quantification at first-order level and this in turn
allows for the application of convenient techniques, such as Sahlqvist techniques for
proving completeness, that do not apply to more common structures for indeterminist
time and agency, such as BT+ACs.
As for the semantics based on choice b-trees, they quantify over sets of primitives
(the histories from Definition 4). Thus they involve a second-order quantification, which
prevents application of Sahlqvist techniques and usually brings some complexity in the
Henkin construction for completeness results. However, bundling is basically the kind
of move that defines a Henkin semantics for second-order logic: by performing it, we
restrict the domain over which the variables range to a possibly proper subset of the
entire domain in question (in our case, the maximal ≺-chains defined on a tree). As it
is well known, this move downgrades expressivity of second-order quantification to that
of many-sorted first-order quantification (we refer the reader to [10] and [29] for this).
This is, in turn, the kind of quantification we have in Kamp agent frames.
Summing up, we get clear technical benefits from the alternative semantics from
Section 2. However, little attention has been paid to their descriptive adequacy—with
a significant exception that we discuss later in this section. One natural question in
this respect is ‘Do the alternative semantics presented here validate desirable principles
17This is due to the fact that the operators from [4] combine quantification over choices with quan-
tification over next moments
of agency and time?’ The axiomatization in Figure 2 gives a positive answer to this
question: the alternative semantics validate established principles for time, modality,
and seeing to it that, while providing natural mixing principles.
Here we approach two other questions concerning descriptive adequacy:
1. Can the semantics from Section 2 prove better than BT+ACs
in describing some scenarios of multi-agent interaction?
2. Do their ontologies provide a sound picture of agency and time?
We answer these two questions in the following two subsections. In order to do this, we
need to talk about choices, and thus we will extend our language with special choice-
formulas. These allow us to express what action the relevant agent is choosing and prove
to be special STIT formulae that hold exactly at the worlds that are compatible with
a given choice. A similar device is implicit in [18], where choices are often expressed
through formulas—see for instance [18, 55-58].
6.1 Adequacy in capturing game scenarios
We discuss a game-theoretical scenario that can be expressed if DTKSMs of Section 3
are the structures on which our language is interpreted, while it cannot be expressed
if discrete BT+ACs are used. Our scenario will be a particular Infinitely Repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IRPD) with two agents 1 and 2 where: (i) agent 1 exploits a
grim strategy, in the sense that she starts cooperating and stops cooperating at some
undetermined future time-point after the other agent decides to defect; (ii) agent 2 is a
free rider, in the sense that she will necessarily defect at some future time-point; (iii)
there is no specific threshold after which agent 1 stops cooperating forever in case agent
2 decides to defect. Feature (iii) corresponds to a kind of indeterminism that can be
modeled via DTKSMs and, consequently, via discrete choice b-trees and discrete Kamp
agent frames but not via discrete BT+AC structures. This is what we are going to
show in the rest of the section.
IRPD is an Infinitely Repeated Game (IRG), that is a repetition of a constituent
game, in our case the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), with no last game-round. Moves are
simultaneous. In PD, each agent i from the set {1, 2} has two actions available: either
she cooperates with the other agent by not confessing the crime (c) or she defects by
confessing (d).18 The formal definition of a PD implies that (d, d) is a Nash Equilibrium,
that it is not Pareto optimal, and that d is a strictly dominating action for each agent.
The basic dynamic at stake with IRPD is well known: in the one-shot PD, each
agent i ∈ {1, 2} has an incentive to play c—which would determine a Pareto optimal
state19 and she is somehow ‘punished’ by the other if she plays d. In particular, this
implies that each agent will defect if the other breaks cooperation first. There are many
possible strategies to enact this kind of punishment. In our example, we will encounter
18We are not interested in assigning specific utilities to the action profiles: any specification that
respects the definition of PD will do. The crucial point of the definition is that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, we
have ui(d, c) > ui(c, c) > ui(d, d) > ui(c, d), where u is a utility function from action-profiles to real
numbers.
19In order to get this, IRPD imposes the additional condition 2u(c, c) > u(d, c) + u(c, d), which
makes cooperation better than alternating cooperation and defection. The condition is often found in
standard examples of the single-round PD, but it is not implied by its definition.
a variant of the so-called grim strategy : one starts cooperating and, after one or more 
defections by the other agent, she stops cooperating and never gets back to cooperation.
In order to formally represent the example, we need to talk about choices over 
alternative actions in LT-STIT(Atm, Agt). To this aim, we extend our language with 
syntactical elements that describe the action chosen by a certain agent. This game-
theoretical extension of STIT is interesting in its own right and displays connections 
with other recent work in STIT, such as [16], but here we will limit ourselves to intro-
ducing the semantical basics and their adequacy with respect to minimal requirements. 
We wish to provide a more structured insight on the extension of LT-STIT(Atm, Agt) in 
future research.
For every agent i ∈ Agt , we introduce a non-empty set Act i. Elements of Act i are 
the actions available to (or choosable by) agent i. Moreover, we extend the definition 
of DTKSM of Section 3 with a function
play i : X −→ Act i
for each agent i that associates every time-point x to the action that agent i chooses 
at x. We impose the following condition on the function play i: for all x, y ∈ X, xRiy 
if and only if play i(x) = play i(y). The condition allows us to label an agent’s choice 
with the name of the action chosen by the agent: two time-points x and y belong to 
the same choice of agent i, if and only if agent i chooses the same action at x and y.
Once actions are defined in our (extended) DTKSMs, we extend the language 
LT-STIT(Atm, Agt) with the resources to express them. We extend the language by 
choice-formulae of the form pl(i, a) where i ranges over Agt and a ranges over Act i and 
which has to read “agent i chooses the action a”. Truth conditions of choice-formulae 
are given by the following clause:
MDK, x |= pl(i, a) ⇔ play i(x) = a
It is clear from the semantics that the formulae pl(i, a) → [i]pl(i, a) and (pl(1, a1) ∧ 
. . . ∧ pl(n, an)) → [Agt ](pl(1, a1) ∧ . . . ∧ pl(n, an)) are valid. These two formulae are 
expected by a suitable encoding of properties of games into a logic of agency. The first 
states that an agent’s action takes place because it is chosen by the agent. The second 
states that a joint action of a coalition takes place because it is chosen by the agents 
in the coalition. The first validity, together with Axiom T for [i], highlights that the 
choice-formula pl(i, a) expresses agency, since it holds if and only if agent i sees to it 
that it holds.
Notice that choice-formulae pl(i, a) are not atoms. Indeed, pl(i, a) → pl(i, a) does 
not hold in general, contrary to what Condition C8 from Definition 15 imposes on 
atoms. This difference between atoms and the new choice-formulae is justified by the 
fact that choices have a ‘trace of futurity’ somehow: a STIT choice is a way to constrain 
the future course of events into a subclass of such courses.
Let us now come back to the particular case of IRPD that we want to describe by 
means of LT-STIT plus the new choice-formulae. As emphasized above, it is character-
ized by three features: (i) necessarily, agent 1 starts cooperating but in case of defection 
of agent 2, sooner of later she will stop cooperating forever; (ii) agent 2 will necessarily 
defect at some future time-point; (iii) there is no specific threshold after which agent
1 stops cooperating forever in case agent 2 decides to defect. Features (i) and (ii) to-
gether imply that, necessarily, at some future time-point agent 1 will cooperate and will
stop cooperating forever afterwards. In our extended DTKSMs, we can capture this in
formal terms as follows:
(1) for every y ∈ R(x), there exists z ∈ RG(y) such that play1(z) = c and, for every
u ∈ RG(z), play1(u) = d.
The kind of indeterminism expressed by feature (iii) guarantees that, for every possible
time-line ℓx in which agent 1 will stop cooperating at a certain point, there exists an
alternative time-line ℓy in which agent 1 will stop cooperating later than in ℓx. A
time-line clearly corresponds to an infinite sequence of action profiles of the constituent
PD, an action profile being a tuple of actions one per each agent in the game. In our
extended DTKSMs, we can capture this in formal terms as follows:
(2) for every y ∈ R(x) and for every z ∈ RG(y), if play1(z) = c then, there exists
u ∈ R(z) and v ∈ RG(u), such that play1(v) = c.
At the syntactic level the previous conditions (1) and (2) are expressed by the following 
formula:
F(pl(1, c) ∧ G¬pl(1, c)) ∧ G(pl(1, c) → ♦F pl(1, c))
As observed in Section 4, such formula is satisfiable in DTKSMs, in discrete choice 
b-trees and in discrete Kamp agent frames but not in discrete BT+ACs. This high-
lights that to model the kind of indeterminism expressed by the previous feature (iii), 
one would need to exclude from the tree of the repeated game the branch that would 
otherwise arise as the limit of all those finite repetitions of cooperation by agent 1, 
that agent 1 does not wish to exclude, because the threshold after which agent 1 stops 
cooperating forever has not been determined yet.
Discussing the example Here, we discuss why, in our view, the ability to provide a 
model fulfilling conditions (i)–(iii) is a virtue of DTKSMs over discrete BT+ACs. In 
particular, we show that DTKSMs can accommodate two equally legitimate views on 
the use of formal modeling, while discrete BT+ACs rule out one of these views.
A crucial point of our example is that conditions (i)–(ii) exclude the option that, for 
every subsequent round of the IRG, agent 1 will cooperate again if she is cooperating 
at all. Accordingly, the relevant DTKSM does not satisfy the formula ♦G(pl(1, c) → 
F pl(1, c)). Of course, it is compatible with the rules of the game that agent 1 keeps 
(or comes back to) cooperating, and so one could wonder why we should exclude the 
option.
The answer to this point depends on the modeling purposes one has. For instance, in 
proposing a formal model for a given IRG, we may want to predict how a given instance 
of the repeated game in question can evolve. It is reasonable to say that our predictions 
will depend on the information we (external modelers) have about the given instance 
of the IRG in question. This information will include the rules of the game (actions 
available and resulting action-profiles, rationality of the players, and so on), but it can 
also include hard information on the kind of players we are modeling. This is what
happens in our example, where condition (ii) tells us that agent 2 is a free rider, and
condition (i) tells us that agent 1 reacts to defection by stopping cooperation, sooner
or later. If we (modelers) receive this information—as we do in the example above—
then we know that the scenario where agent 1 keeps (or comes back to) cooperating
cannot hold, since it is incompatible with conditions (i)–(ii). As a consequence, if our
aim is to provide a model that predicts how our particular example—which includes
(i)–(iii)—can evolve, then excluding the scenario where agent 1 keeps (or comes back
to) cooperating (if she is cooperating at all) is a legitimate move.20
A different answer may come if we assume some other perspective on the use of for-
mal models. For instance, one can hold the view that our models should represent how
the choices of different agents operate on a given set of objective possibilities. These
are, in turn, possibilities that are due to how the world is at a given moment. The
intuition here is that, at each moment, the choices of the agents act so as to exclude
some of the objective possibilities that are defined in the model. This view requires that
all such possibilities are represented in the model, as a background against which the
choices are made.21 In the case of an IRG, what is objectively possible is determined
by the rules of the game, and the view above turns to imply that we should capture
everything that is compatible with such rules. From this point of view, excluding the
above scenario—where agent 1 keeps (or comes back to) cooperating at some point—is
not a legitimate move, since the scenario is compatible with the rules of IRPDs.
Thus, we have (at least) two different views on what we do when we model a game
(or some other kind of multi-agent interaction, in principle), and they suggest different
answers to our initial question. It is reasonable to hold that both views are legitimate
in their own right. There is nothing wrong in building a model in order to predict (or
describe) a specific instance of a phenomenon, and there is nothing wrong with a more
general focus that wishes to cast agency against all the objective possibilities.
Consistently with this, we believe that we should opt for the modeling tool that
can accommodate both views. From this point of view, DTKSMs score better than
discrete BT+ACs. Indeed, we have DTKSMs where—just to stick to our example—
G(pl(1, c)→ ♦F pl(1, c)) is satisfied and ♦G(pl(1, c)→ F pl(1, c)) is not. This captures
the situations where conditions (i)–(iii) are taken into account, and it fares well with
the first methodological view on modeling that we have introduced. However, we also
have DTKSMs where both G(pl(1, c) → ♦F pl(1, c)) and ♦G(pl(1, c) → F pl(1, c)) are
satisfied—which fares well with the second methodological view that we have intro-
duced. This follows from the fact that every discrete choice b-tree corresponds to a
DTKSM, and that this correspondence preserves satisfiability—see proof of Theorem 2
in the Appendix. Since discrete BT+ACs are special cases of discrete choice b-trees,
there are DTKSMs satisfying G(pl(1, c)→ ♦F pl(1, c))→ ♦G(pl(1, c)→ F pl(1, c)).
By contrast, discrete BT+ACs rule out the possibility to proceed along the lines
of the first methodological view. Since they make G(pl(1, c) → ♦F pl(1, c)) →
♦G(pl(1, c) → F pl(1, c)) valid, they do not let us model a scenario where conditions
20Notice that the exclusion of the scenario above recalls the application of integrity constraints [22]
in Artificial Intelligence—in particular, in knowledge representation. These constraints select away
some states in a structure as non-admitted in the description of a given phenomenon.
21We thank one anonymous referee for pointing this perspective to us.
(i)–(iii) are satisfied—or, more generally, a scenario where these conditions are admitted
as a part of the game description.
In sum, DTKSMs accommodate both methodological views, and let us switch from
the one to the other in accordance with our modeling purposes of the moment. By
contrast, discrete BT+ACs can accommodate just one of the two views above. Rea-
sonably, a toolkit that is flexible enough to fit different (legitimate) modeling purposes
is to be preferred over a toolkit that fits just one (legitimate) modeling purpose. As a
consequence, we believe that the expressive ability exemplified in the example of the
IRPD above is a virtue of DTKSMs over discrete BT+ACs.
An analogous discussion in temporal logic A comparison between trees and Kamp
frames—or equivalent structures—has been presented in temporal logic by Belnap and
colleagues—see[2, 7A.6]. The example from [2] concerns a particular radium atom
a that, at each moment, may decay or not.22 The example assumes that, for every
moment, if a has not yet decayed, then it is possible that will decay in the next moment,
and it is possible that a will not decay in the next moment.23 A consequence of this is
that (⋆) every sequence of ‘no-decay moments’ can be extended by at least one moment.
This situation is compatible with full trees, on the one hand, and Ockhamist frames,
Kamp frames, and bundled trees, on the other. Consider now the reasonable sentence
(⋆⋆) ‘at the starting moment, it is inevitable that a will decay after a finite sequence of
moments’.24 As noticed in [2], (⋆) and (⋆⋆) can be satisfied together in an Ockhamist
or Kamp frame, or in a bundled tree, but not in a full tree.
[2, 7A.6] reacts to this by deploying the second methodological view that we have
introduced above: they seem to imply that (⋆⋆) is an objective possibility and that, as
such, it should be accounted for.25 We do not disagree with [2]. Simply, we believe
that their insight should not be generalized to every situation one could wish to model.
After all, the discussion from the previous section has shown that we might want to go
with a different methodological view, which may on specific occasions require structures
that are not based on full trees.
6.2 Sound picture of agency and time
The above discussion seems to shed some light on the picture of agency and time in
the different semantics presented here, and their respective soundness. BT+AC include
trees, which are usually assumed as a sound picture of time [2, 27]. Also, we can
associate moments of a BT+AC with (single instances of the) constituent game from
an IRG and histories being associated with maximal and linear sequences of repeated
constituent games. However, as we have shown in the previous section, BT+ACs rule
22The example from [2] involves a continuous time, with the relevant moments being marked by
ticks—which can be in turn be put in correspondence with the naturals. Here, we simplify the scenario
by assuming that, for every history, the moments in the history can be put in correspondence with the
naturals.
23In symbols, the assumption implies G(¬p→ (♦Fp∧♦F¬p)), where ¬p is ‘atom a does not decay’.
24In symbols, this assumption implies F(¬p ∧ Gp).
25Another reaction, due to both [2] and [27], is that (⋆) and (⋆⋆) are mutually incompatible. We
agree with [32] that this view actually presupposes the choice of full trees over Kamp frames, Ockhamist
frames, and bundled trees, and thus it does not help settle the issue.
out some scenarios that are consistent with the definition of an IRPD, and this somehow 
limits the soundness of the picture of agency they offer.
One natural question is whether the alternative semantics from Section 2 can capture 
entities from IRGs and temporal entities in a sound way. In this respect, choice b-
trees seem to score some good points: they provide the same intuitive picture of time 
as BT+ACs and model some game-theoretical scenario better than BT+ACs do—see 
previous section. The interesting point here is bundling. Indeed, bundling amounts to 
leaving out some histories in a tree, and this allows us to leaving out those sequences of 
action profiles that are not relevant for the description of a given IRG (see our example 
in the previous section, where endless repetition of cooperation by agent 1 is excluded). 
In this sense, choice b-trees may provide the exact temporal structure of a given IRG, 
while BT+AC seems to provide a fixed temporal structure imposing some constraint 
on the development of an IRG.
As for Kamp agent frames, times can be thought of as instances of the constituent 
game (‘game-rounds’) and worlds can be thought as the admitted maximal linear se-
quences of action profiles from the given game. Two such sequences w and w′ would 
then be matching at game-round t if the two sequences evolve in exactly the same way 
up to (and including) round t, and possibly get distinct later.
In TKSFs, time-points correspond to moment-history pairs in choice b-trees, and in 
turn, in TKSFs, moments and histories can be constructed out of time-points and time-
lines: a moment m is a class R(x) of mutually alternative time-points (see Section 2), 
a TKSF-history hx originating from x is a class of moments R(y) such that y is in the 
time-line of x (see proof of Theorem 2 in the technical appendix at the end of the paper). 
The relation between a time-point x in a TKSF and the corresponding moment R(x) 
seems to parallel the relation between the occurrence of a specific action profile of the 
constituent game in a given IRG and a complete description of the constituent game 
in which all possible action profiles are represented. As emphasized in the previous 
section, a natural interpretation of time-lines in a TKSF is to conceive them as infinite 
sequences of action profiles of the constituent game in a given IRG.
7 Conclusion
We have provided an equivalence result for three existing semantics of temporal STIT 
(T-STIT): the Kripke-style semantics for T-STIT recently introduced in [20], a seman-
tics based on the concept of Kamp frame and a bundled tree semantics for T-STIT. 
In the second part of the paper, we have introduced a semantics for T-STIT based on 
Fagin et al.’s concept of interpreted system and proven its equivalence with a restricted 
class of temporal Kripke STIT models with discrete time and initial point.
We plan to devote future research to the investigation of the interpreted system 
semantics for T-STIT introduced in Section 3. In particular, we plan to find a complete 
axiomatization for T-STIT relative to this semantics and to compare it with the existing 
axiomatization for T-STIT relative to the class of TKSMs given in [20]. Finally, we 
plan to investigate additive and superadditive full group STIT logics based on fused 
temporal-stit operators in the style of [4] and [9]. Their decidability is still an open 
issue, (see Section 5) and a positive result would make these logics a convenient tool to 
reason about coalitional agency.
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A Technical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
(⇒) We first prove the left-to-right direction of the theorem, that is, we show that if ϕ
is satisfiable in a Kamp agent model, then it is satisfiable in a TKSM.
Let MF = (W,O, {∼t}t∈T , {∼〈t,i〉}t∈T,i∈Agt , {∼〈t,Agt〉}t∈T , π) be a Kamp agent
model and let 〈t0, w0〉 be a time-world pair such that M
F , 〈t0, w0〉 |= ϕ. From the
Kamp agent model MF we define the corresponding structure
MK = (X,R, {Ri}i∈Agt ,RAgt ,RG,RH,V) with:
• X = {〈t, w〉|w ∈W and t ∈ Tw},
• R = {(〈t, w〉, 〈t
′, w′〉)|t = t′ and w ∼t w
′},
• Ri = {(〈t, w〉, 〈t
′, w′〉)|t = t′ and w ∼t,i w
′},
• RAgt = {(〈t, w〉, 〈t
′, w′〉)|t = t′ and w ∼〈t,Agt〉 w
′},
• RG = {(〈t, w〉, 〈t
′, w′〉)|w = w′ and t <w t
′} and RH is the inverse relation of RG,
• for all p ∈ Atm and 〈t, w〉 ∈ X, 〈t, w〉 ∈ V(p) iff t ∈ π(p).
It is a routine task to check that MK is a TKSM. Moreover, by induction on the
structure of ϕ, it is easy to check that for every T-STIT formula ϕ and for every time-
world pair 〈t, w〉 in X, MF , 〈t, w〉 |= ϕ iff MK, 〈t, w〉 |= ϕ. Hence, from the initial
assumption MF , 〈t0, w0〉 |= ϕ, we have M
K, 〈t0, w0〉 |= ϕ.
(⇐) Now, we prove the right-to-left direction of the theorem, that is, we show that
if ϕ is satisfiable in a TKSM, then it is satisfiable in a Kamp agent model.
Let MK = (X,R, {Ri}i∈Agt ,RAgt ,RG,RH,V) be a TKSM and x0 a point in X
such that MK, x0 |= ϕ. Let us remind the reader of the definition of the set T (x) =
RH(x)∪ {x} ∪RG(x) of the time-points that are temporally related with time-point x,
and of the time-line ℓx as the linearly ordered set (T (x),RG). Also, recall the definition
of TL as the set {ℓx|x ∈ X}. When the subscript x is not needed, we will feel free to
drop it. Also, for every ℓ, let us define Tℓ = {R(y)|y ∈ ℓ}. From the TKSM M
K we
define the corresponding structure F = (W,O, {∼t}t∈T , {∼〈t,i〉}t∈T,i∈Agt , {∼〈t,Agt〉}t∈T )
where:
• W = TL,
• for all w ∈W , Tw = {R(x)|x ∈ w},
• for all w ∈W and for all t, t′ ∈ T , t <w t
′ iff ∃x ∈ t, ∃y ∈ t′
such that xRGy,
• for all t ∈ T and for all w,w′ ∈ T , w ∼t w
′ iff t ∈ Tw ∩ Tw′ ,
• for all t ∈ T and for all w,w′ ∈ T , w ∼〈t,i〉 w
′ iff:
– t ∈ Tw ∩ Tw′ , and
– ∃x, y ∈ t such that xRiy, x ∈ w and y ∈ w
′,
• for all t ∈ T and for all w,w′ ∈ T , w ∼〈t,Agt〉 w
′ iff:
– t ∈ Tw ∩ Tw′ , and
– ∃x, y ∈ t such that xRAgty, x ∈ w and y ∈ w
′.
It is a routine task to check that F is a Kamp agent frame. Because of the Constraint
C7 in the definition of TKSF, we have that, for all t ∈ T and for all w ∈W , if t∩w 6= ∅
then t ∩ w is a singleton. We write tw to denote the unique element in t ∩ w, when
t ∩ w 6= ∅. Moreover, for all x ∈ X, {〈t, w〉|t ∩ w = {x}} is also a singleton. We write
〈t, w〉x to denote the unique element in {〈t, w〉|t ∩ w = {x}}.
For all p ∈ Atm, let:
• π(p) =
{
t ∈ T |∃x ∈ t such that MK, x |= p
}
.
Clearly, MF = (F , π) is a Kamp agent model. Moreover, by induction on the
structure of ϕ, it is easy to check that for every T-STIT formula ϕ and for every
point x ∈ X, MK, x |= ϕ iff MF , 〈t, w〉x |= ϕ. Hence, from the initial assumption
MK, x0 |= ϕ, we have M
F , 〈t, w〉x0 |= ϕ.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1.
(⇒) We first prove the left-to-right direction of the theorem, that is, we show that
if ϕ is satisfiable in a choice b-tree model, then it is satisfiable in a TKSM.
Let MB = (T, B, {∼〈m,i〉}m∈M,i∈Agt , {∼〈m,Agt〉}m∈M , υ) be a choice b-tree model
and let 〈m0, h0〉 be a moment-history pair such that
MB, 〈m0, h0〉 |= ϕ. From the choice b-tree model M
B we define the corresponding
structure MK = (X,R,
{Ri}i∈Agt ,RAgt ,RG,RH,V) with:
• X = {〈m,h〉 | m ∈M and h ∈ Bm},
• R = {(〈m,h〉, 〈m
′, h′〉)|m = m′ and h, h′ ∈ Bm},
• Ri = {(〈m,h〉, 〈m
′, h′〉)|m = m′ and h ∼〈m,i〉 h
′},
• RAgt = {(〈m,h〉, 〈m
′, h′〉)|m = m′ and h ∼〈m,Agt〉 h
′},
• RG = {(〈m,h〉, 〈m
′, h′〉)|h = h′ and m ≺ m′} and RH is the inverse relation of
RG,
• for all p ∈ Atm and 〈m,h〉 ∈ X, 〈m,h〉 ∈ V(p) iff m ∈ υ(p).
It is a routine task to check that MK is a TKSM. Moreover, by induction on the 
structure of ϕ, it is easy to check that for every T-STIT formula ϕ and for every 
moment-history pair 〈m, h〉, MB, 〈m, h〉 |= ϕ iff MK, 〈m, h〉 |= ϕ. Hence, from the 
initial assumption MB, 〈m0, h0〉 |= ϕ, we have MK, 〈m0, h0〉 |= ϕ.
(⇐) Now, we prove the right-to-left direction of the theorem, that is, we show that 
if ϕ is satisfiable in a TKSM, then it is satisfiable in a choice b-tree model.
Let MK = (K,V) be a TKSM based on the TKSF K = (X,R,
{Ri}i∈Agt ,RAgt ,RG,RH) and x0 a point in X such that M
K, x0 |= ϕ.
For every x ∈ X, we define the x-relative TKSF-history hx in K: hx = {R(y)|y ∈
T (x)}. Moreover, we define the set BK = {hx|x ∈ X} of TKSF-histories in K. As
we shall see, BK is a bundle in B
K. Notice that the definition of hx differs from the
definition of ℓx since the former has set-theoretical constructions over time-points as
its elements, while the latter has time-points themselves as elements. As usual, we will
omit the subscript x when it is not needed.
From the TKSM MK we define the corresponding structure B = (T, B,
{∼〈m,i〉}m∈M,i∈Agt , {∼〈m,Agt〉}m∈M ) where:
• M = {R(x)|x ∈ X},
• for all m,m′ ∈M , m ≺ m′ iff ∃x ∈ m and ∃y ∈ m′ such that xRGy,
• B = BK,
• for all m ∈M , h ∼〈m,i〉 h
′ iff:
– h, h′ ∈ Bm, and
– ∃x, y ∈ m such that xRiy, hx = h and hy = h
′,
• for all m ∈M , h ∼〈m,Agt〉 h
′ iff:
– h, h′ ∈ Bm, and
– ∃x, y ∈ m such that xRAgty, hx = h and hy = h
′.
It is a routine task to check that B is a choice b-tree.
For all, p ∈ Atm let:
• υ(p) =
{
m ∈M |∃x ∈ m such that MK, x |= p
}
.
Clearly, MB = (B, υ) is a choice-b model. Moreover, by induction on the structure
of ϕ, it is easy to check that for every T-STIT formula ϕ and for every point x ∈ X,
MK, x |= ϕ iff MB, 〈R(x), hx〉 |= ϕ. Hence, from the initial assumption M
K, x0 |= ϕ,
we have MB, 〈R(x0), hx0〉 |= ϕ.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
(⇒) Let MDK = (X,R, {Ri}i∈Agt ,RAgt ,RX,V) be a DTKSM and let x0 ∈ X such
that MDK, x0 |= ϕ.
Let Le be an arbitrary set of local states of the environment and ge an injection
from X/R (i.e., the quotient set of X by R) to Le. The fact that ge is an injection
implies that the size of Le is equal to or higher than the size of X/R.
Let Li be an arbitrary set of local states of agent i. Moreover, let Y ∈ X/R. Then,
gYi is an injection from Y/Ri to Li. The fact that g
Y
i is an injection implies that the
size of Li is equal to or higher than the size of Y/Ri.
Let G = Le × L1 × . . .× Ln be the set of global systems.
Because of the Constraints C7 and C9 in Definition 15, the fact that RX is serial 
and deterministic, the fact that RY is deterministic and that RG is defined to be the
transitive closure of RX, for every time-line ℓx ∈ TL we can define a corresponding
bijective function γx : N −→ T (x) such that for all y ∈ X and for all k ∈ N:
γx(k) = y iff |RH(y)| = k.
Thus, for every time-line ℓx ∈ TL, we can define a corresponding run rx : N −→ G
such that:
• for all k ∈ N and for all x ∈ X,
rx(k) = (ge(R(γx(k))), g
R(γx(k))
1 (Ri(γx(k))), . . . , g
R(γx(k))
n (Rn(γx(k)))).
Let S = {rx : x ∈ X} be the corresponding system.
Let ω be the valuation function defined as follows:
• for all p ∈ Atm and for all (rx, k) ∈ P, (rx, k) ∈ ω(p) iff γx(k) ∈ V(p).
It is straightforward to prove that the interpreted system I = (S, ω) is a STIT
interpreted system. Moreover, by induction on the structure of ϕ, it is a routine task
to verify that (I, rx0 , γ
−1
x0
(x0)) |= ϕ.
(⇐) Let I = (S, ω) be a STIT interpreted system and (r0, k0) a point in I such
that (I, r0, k0) |= ϕ. Let us define the tuple M
DK = (X,R, {Ri}i∈Agt ,
RAgt ,RX,V) as follows:
• X = P,
• for all (r, k), (r′, k′) ∈ X, (r, k)R(r
′, k′) iff (r, k) ≡e (r
′, k′),
• for all (r, k), (r′, k′) ∈ X, (r, k)Ri(r
′, k′) iff (r, k) ≡i (r
′, k′),
• for all (r, k), (r′, k′) ∈ X, (r, k)RAgt(r
′, k′) iff (r, k) ≡Agt (r
′, k′),
• for all (r, k), (r′, k′) ∈ X, (r, k)RX(r
′, k′) iff r = r′ and k′ = k + 1,
• for all p ∈ Atm, V(p) = ω(p).
It is straightforward to prove that MDK is a DTKSM. Moreover, by induction on
the structure of ϕ, it is a routine task to verify that MDK, (r0, k0) |= ϕ.
